Destabilising Lebanon: Pathway For Israel’s Favoured ‘New Middle East’?

Empowering Weak & Oppressed

Omar Ahmed

Jumada' al-Akhirah 10, 1447 2025-12-01

News & Analysis

by Omar Ahmed

A fragile ‘ceasefire’ agreement for Gaza, which has been repeatedly violated, has also allowed the zionist entity to face little to no repercussions for launching strikes against Hizbullah in Lebanon. This followed a ceasefire signed between the zionist entity and Hizbullah in November 2024, and as it stands, has been rendered meaningless.

It is a common theme with the occupation state, with any ceasefire that it is a party to, collapsing soon after its signing. As such, constant bombardments in southern Lebanon extending up to Beirut itself have taken place, in total disregard of Lebanon’s sovereignty. The latest zionist crime was perpetrated on November 23. The occupying entity attacked an apartment building in south Beirut killing Hizbullah commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai and eight others.

Hizbullah currently remains the only significant roadblock to US-Israeli ambitions for a so-called ‘New Middle East.’ But what’s the deeper game?

Breaking the bulwark

The 20th century saw the Lebanese state torn apart by sectarian violence. Its unique confessionalist system that assigns government offices based on religious affiliation was sensitive to demographic changes and the influence of foreign powers. One of its first major destabilising events was the push of Palestinian refugees fleeing violence at the hands of the occupation army.

The PLO’s arrival with those refugees in the 1960s and 1970s, who were welcomed by Sunni factions but opposed by others, coupled with the Lebanese state’s incapacity to control rival armed groups, led to the civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990. During this time, foreign militaries such as the zionist occupation army and Syria and non-state militias emerged as the true power brokers while state institutions deteriorated.

By shifting sectarian power-sharing in favour of Muslim factions, the Taif Agreement in 1989 put an end to the war, but it did not disarm militias or establish a powerful central government. Hizbullah would become a stable link in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of growing inflation and the ongoing failure to establish a functioning state.

Hizbullah was formed out of neglected Shia communities suffering from the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and thus, its belief systems crystallised around an unyielding opposition to the zionist entity and its allies, the US included.

Of course, as a non-state actor, it needed a sponsor. Iran became such through common religious ties and a determined shared opposition to the occupation. As Iran slowly built its Axis of Resistance in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq, Hizbullah became its major ally. But how did it become such an important player?

Since the beginning of the secret normalisation of ties leading to the first round of overt normalisation agreements under the Abrahamic Accords, only Hizbullah emerged in the immediate region to oppose the entity and side with Palestinian resistance movement Hamas.

Fast forward to the 2020s, and Hizbullah stands militarily as the most powerful and capable non-state actor standing in the zionist entity’s way. The geography of South Lebanon and regional dynamics make a full-scale push by Tel Aviv, similar to its 2006 invasion of Lebanon, very costly for the invaders. Furthermore, Hizbullah’s approach towards the occupation state is in line with majoritarian stances across the wider Muslim world.

Pressure on the entity’s northern axis

Hizbullah had deployed its vast rocket arsenal in support of Hamas, starting right from October 2023, with sustained rocket volleys and UAV strikes. Combined with Hamas’ own rocket volleys, the zionist entity’s missile defence systems, such as the vaunted Iron Dome, were all put under serious pressure leading into 2024. Why? Because the cost ratio of using systems such as Iron Dome or David’s Sling against much cheaper unguided rockets is heavily set against the occupation state.

Northern occupied Palestine overall remained a prime target, leading to great strategic uncertainty and civil unrest. Hizbullah has supported a steady pace of targeted attacks against important occupation military locations, radars, communication hubs, and border posts utilising rockets, armed drones, anti-tank guided missiles, and precision fire.

The occupation forces are forced to maintain an expensive, protracted advance deployment along the northern frontier due to this consistent operational rhythm, which ties down infantry units, air defence equipment, and surveillance systems that would otherwise be employed in Gaza.

In order to make detection and preemption challenging, Hizbullah’s strategy also makes use of tactical dispersion and unpredictability. Small teams operate from fortified or hidden firing positions, altering patterns, routes, and timing.

Even when not fully utilised, the movement’s substantial rocket stockpile, which includes medium-range systems that can reach Haifa and short-range nuisance rockets, remains a constant strategic danger.

However, the entity has not taken the bait by launching a general invasion of Southern Lebanon like in 2006. Instead, knowing that the Lebanese central government is weak and unable to assert itself, the occupation air force took advantage of it and began launching airstrikes deep into central Lebanon. Strikes inside the capital city Beirut started to become commonplace, and it was these strikes that led to the martyrdom of Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah and his close leadership circle, that held Hizbullah together since the 1980s.

Of course, these strikes also resulted in civilian deaths, increasing Lebanese animosity towards the zionist entity. The lack of any meaningful protests from Lebanon and the wider Arab League, in conjunction with US diplomatic backing, allowed Tel Aviv to get away with such aggressive actions. The impunity granted to Israel went to such an extent that the occupation air force even conducted a fly-past during Nasrallah’s funeral on February 23, 2025.

The fact that these constant humiliations of Lebanon accompany the deaths of civilians makes one thing clear: Lebanon’s wellbeing holds no value to either the zionist entity or its allies, and it is an indication that they are willing to cause its collapse in order to fulfil the occupation state’s anti-Palestinian ambitions.

Quite telling is the fact that the zionist entity backed by the US demand the disarmament of Hizbullah. This would leave them vulnerable to rival Lebanese factions while also leaving the country without an institution capable of asserting sovereign power.

But Hizbullah’s resistance to such designs has remained defiant.

Feeding the endless destabilisation loop

In their constant attempts to disarm and disintegrate Hizbullah through military means, US and occupation strategists only ensure the opposite at best, or are pushing the entirety of Lebanon towards total collapse at worst. As Hizbullah has consistently refused to disarm, the zionist entity has claimed it as its license to continue its attacks on South Lebanese villages as well as on Beirut.

Airstrikes since June 2025 have attempted to target drone factories, missile launchers, observation posts, and artillery positions. The tempo of these strikes has varied, with a notable uptick in October continuing onwards through the time of writing.

Of particular concern for the zionist entity is the Radwan special operations unit, which is trained for infiltrations into occupied Palestine. While they have not brought about significant events pertaining to military infiltrations, they remain a threat nonetheless.

Taking Hizbullah out of the equation might be a matter of impoverishing Lebanon to such an extent that Lebanese society collapses in on itself and starts viewing Hizbullah as a roadblock instead of the zionist entity.

Since the 2000s, Lebanon’s economy has been weak, and subsequent crashes in the 2010s and early 2020s have only complicated things further. It has created the kind of atmosphere necessary for the central Lebanese government in Beirut to draw up draft plans to work towards neutralising Hizbullah completely.

Hizbullah is under increasing existential pressure as a result of the US-occupation state disarmament effort first floated in April 2025. The pressure is further reflected in the roadmap approved by Beirut, seeing a chance to finally attempt to delegitimise Hizbullah and reclaim its monopoly on violence.

Through the details of the plan and the media blitz since then, the group is portrayed as a huge liability in Lebanon’s negotiations with international powers as well as a threat to Lebanese sovereignty.

Other groups may feel more emboldened to take action now that the Lebanese cabinet has formally endorsed the plan’s “objectives”. Some may support the government’s efforts to control Hizbullah because they sense an opportunity to reduce the power and reach of a Shia resistance group, without care or consideration for the bigger picture surrounding it.

Hizbullah, however, perceives this as a direct challenge to its fundamental “resistance” identity. Its officials have openly opposed complete disarmament, claiming that ceding weapons under the current circumstances would give Israel the upper hand. This narrative is likely to energise its supporters and possibly lead to internal mobilisation or even rebellion.

Hizbullah has declared that it will fight “if necessary to confront this American-Israeli project no matter the cost”, if the government, supported by the Lebanese army, attempts to implement disarmament. Furthermore, the US is indirectly bolstering the Lebanese state military in comparison to Hizbullah by assigning it the goal of creating a plan to monopolize armaments by year’s end, with support from the US.

This change may provide non-Shia political or sectarian actors, or even certain members of the Shia community, more confidence to support state forces over Hizbullah, particularly if they think the government and its supporters can eventually impose a state monopoly on force. This ties in to the often zero-sum nature of communal politics in Lebanon, almost always threatening to tear the country apart.

What is being proposed here is a bone-headed move towards a plan that ostensibly returns the monopoly of violence towards the Lebanese government, but without a roadmap for meaningful change.

Change that removes the underlying causes leading to Lebanon becoming such a fractured society in the first place, and part of that involves returning Palestinian refugees. Is causing yet another civil war in Lebanon to neutralise Hizbullah the long-term plan? The zionist entity’s constant ceasefire violations might be an indication towards just that.