Implications Of Russia’s Diplomatic Recognition Of The Taliban Government

Developing Just Leadership

Omar Ahmed

Safar 07, 1447 2025-08-01

News & Analysis

by Omar Ahmed (News & Analysis, Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 6, Safar, 1447)

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, re-established by the Taliban in August 2021, remains diplomatically isolated by most of the world. Few are willing to grant legitimacy to a government born of armed resistance by an Islamic movement that ousted a US-backed regime.

Yet some states have deviated from this stance. Several of Afghanistan’s neighbors have engaged with the Taliban out of necessity; others aim to normalize ties and treat Kabul’s new rulers as they would any sovereign government.

But Russia has gone further. In July 2025, Moscow became the first state to formally recognize the Taliban government. This move surpasses mere diplomatic engagement or the maintenance of consular services—it represents full recognition, a step not even Pakistan or the Persian Gulf monarchies have taken.

Why has Russia done this—and what are the broader implications?

Deepening ties

Russia has maintained a working relationship with the Taliban since at least the early 2010s. After reasserting itself on the global stage in the late 2000s—militarily in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015)—Moscow increasingly positioned itself as a counterweight to US hegemony. Afghanistan was no exception.

The New York Times and The Insider, in collaboration with Der Spiegel, reported in 2020 and 2025, respectively, that throughout the US military occupation of Afghanistan, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) paid the Taliban exorbitant sums to target and kill US troops.

These killings by themselves didn’t have much or any strategic impact throughout the course of the occupation, but the NYT report did cause US President Donald Trump some inconveniences near the end of his term. Of course, both Russia and the Taliban deny that any deal of this kind ever existed, but it’s clear that a working relationship existed between them for a long time.

Moscow’s interest in building ties with the Taliban is driven by security imperatives—chief among them the threat posed by the Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-KP), a splinter of Daesh. IS-KP has clashed with both the previous Republican regime and the Taliban over ideological and strategic disagreements.

Russia is a prime IS-KP target for two reasons. First, its 2015 military intervention in Syria helped reverse Daesh’s territorial gains and cemented ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s hold on power. Second, IS-KP harbors many fighters from Chechnya and Central Asia, who carry grievances rooted in Moscow’s brutal campaigns in the Caucasus during the 1990s.

Four armed terrorists assaulted the Crocus City Hall music venue outside Moscow in March 2024, killing over 150 people and injuring over 100 more. The event was Russia’s bloodiest terrorist strike in the previous 20 years. The attack is generally known to have been planned by IS-KP.

A calculated power play

China has rapidly entrenched itself in Afghanistan’s economy, securing strategic resource contracts—including the Mes Aynak copper mine in Logar Province, northern oil fields, and lithium exploration. These assets are central to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which increasingly shapes infrastructure and trade in the region.

Beijing has also positioned itself as a diplomatic broker in Afghan affairs. While Sino-Russian cooperation appears mutually beneficial, from intelligence to military and political coordination—tensions lurk beneath the surface.

A recent FSB memo leak suggests Moscow views Beijing’s rise with unease. Russian intelligence reportedly warns of Chinese recruitment of Russian assets and growing interest in the Arctic—a domain Russia considers vital to its strategic future. China, not an Arctic state, is nevertheless eyeing emerging trade routes and resource opportunities.

Thus, Russia’s move to bolster ties with the Taliban may be part of a broader strategy to maintain regional influence in the face of Beijing’s dominance. Following setbacks in Syria and increasing reliance on China due to sanctions and the war in Ukraine, Moscow is scrambling to assert its relevance.

Afghanistan, therefore, becomes a crucial theater. Though there is no immediate sign that the Taliban will invite Russian private military contractors into the country—Moscow’s preferred model in Africa—this may change if the IS-KP threat escalates.

Opening new doors

Russia’s recognition of the Taliban government serves mutual interests. In July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the Taliban as “allies in the fight against terrorism,” signaling Moscow’s readiness to deepen security collaboration.

For the Taliban, who face persistent attacks from IS-KP, and international isolation, such recognition offers vital diplomatic support—and a potential blueprint for broader global acceptance. Should Moscow extend tangible counterterrorism assistance, it would demonstrate the Taliban’s seriousness in confronting IS-KP.

However, the Taliban’s primary obstacle to legitimacy lies not with foreign states but with internal opposition.

In February 2024, the Taliban refused to attend a UN-led conference on Afghanistan in Doha, citing disputes over the agenda. The conference aimed to appoint a special UN envoy and begin talks on women’s rights, inclusive governance, and human development. Yet by June 30, a Taliban delegation did attend the third UN special envoys’ meeting in Doha—but only after securing the exclusion of Afghan civil society representatives.

On July 2, UN officials met separately with non-Taliban Afghan figures, none of whom was allowed to participate officially. Even within the Taliban, fissures are deepening over key issues such as girls’ education.

Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, deputy foreign minister, has voiced support for women’s rights and education, but such views are rejected by Taliban hardliners, particularly supreme leader Mullah Hibbatullah Akhundzada. In early 2023, acting interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani publicly challenged Akhundzada, but dissent has since been brutally quashed. Even intra-Taliban pluralism is under siege.

This ideological rigidity continues to undermine the Taliban’s bid for normalization. Even close partners like Qatar insist that issues around rights and governance must be addressed. While the Afghan economy is slowly recovering and UN engagement on humanitarian needs is ongoing, excluding half the population from public life is both unsustainable and incompatible with modern governance.

Moscow’s decision could be the Taliban’s opening—if they are willing to seize it. A deeper security partnership with Russia, coupled with measured reforms, would suggest Kabul is prepared to operate as a serious state actor.

It would also affirm that the Taliban are capable of functioning within a multipolar world order—on terms not dictated by western approval, but by regional pragmatism and mutual interests.