Implications Of Saudi-Emirati Differences Over Yemen

Developing Just Leadership

Omar Ahmed

Sha'ban 13, 1447 2026-02-01

News & Analysis

by Omar Ahmed (News & Analysis, Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 12, Sha'ban, 1447)

December 2025 will be remembered as the month a third front burst open in the long-running war in Yemen. The Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the UAE, launched a sudden attack on its former ally, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC). The two had formed the core of the Saudi-led ‘Sunni’ bloc fighting against the Ansarallah-aligned government based in Sana‘a.

Yemen’s war has long been shaped by foreign actors—chiefly Saudi Arabia and Iran—but December’s events signaled Abu Dhabi’s bid to emerge as a third force in its own right. With Emirati arms and direction, the STC embarked on a lightning offensive that threatened to unravel the fragile anti-Ansarallah coalition.

Yet just as quickly as the offensive began, it collapsed. Saudi airstrikes shredded Emirati-supplied assets. The headlines noted the strikes, but few paused to ask why Riyadh appeared to be bombing its Gulf partner. Then the STC vanished from the battlefield, its political ambitions shattered, its forces broken.

The STC: Tool of Abu Dhabi’s ambitions

The STC emerged with the stated aim to restore the former South Yemen, a state that existed from 1967 to 1990 before unification with the north. Occasionally, STC officials tempered that goal by suggesting a federal Yemen with southern autonomy.

This demand draws on a history of marginalization. After unification, the new state was ruled centrally from Sana‘a, sidelining former southern leaders and embedding northern ‘Islamist’ factions, especially from the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate Islah, deep into the system. Southern grievances first exploded in 1994, when a southern attempt to secede was crushed by northern forces.

Decades later, the Saudi-led coalition against the Ansarallah movement inadvertently revived southern separatism. As the war dragged on and the anti-“Houthi” bloc fractured, the UAE saw an opportunity. It backed the creation of the STC as a secular, southern counterweight to the ‘Islamist’-dominated Islah Party.

In theory, the 2022 formation of the PLC under President Rashad al-Alimi was meant to unify the anti-Ansarallah front. In practice, it was a bandage over deep fissures. The STC signed the 2019 Riyadh Agreement and later joined the PLC, but still declared “self-governance” in 2020. By late 2025, the council announced a two-year roadmap to statehood and a southern referendum.

Undoubtedly, this was the flashpoint for tensions between the STC and the PLC, prompting the start of its December 2025 offensive.

Emirati backing emboldened the STC to turn that roadmap into a military offensive. For Abu Dhabi, the STC represented a loyal, secular actor through which to project influence.

Ports, proxies, and political Islam

The UAE had long supported the Saudi-led war, but with distinct goals. While Riyadh focused on restoring the previous Sana‘a-based government, Abu Dhabi’s eyes were on southern Yemen’s ports and chokepoints, especially the Bab al-Mandab Strait. From there, it could extend influence into the Horn of Africa and beyond.

To secure these interests, the UAE funded and trained local militias like the Hadhrami Elite Force. These groups not only enforced order but guaranteed Emirati commercial and military access.

One of the most controversial aspects of the UAE’s strategy has been its reported cooperation with Israel to establish intelligence-gathering bases on Socotra Island. These facilities, strategically located in the Arabian Sea, have raised alarm in both Sana‘a and Tehran about an expanding Emirati-Israeli surveillance network aimed at regional adversaries.

But there was another dimension. The UAE’s post-2013 foreign policy has been defined by opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates, including Islah. The Brotherhood’s clerical legitimacy and populist appeal made it a systemic threat to Gulf monarchies that rely on dynastic rule, technocratic management, and controlled religious discourse.

The 2013 military coup in Egypt, bankrolled by Abu Dhabi, crystallized this worldview. In the years since, the UAE has pursued a regional axis to crush ‘Islamist’ movements—in Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, and now Yemen.

Abu Dhabi lacks Riyadh’s religious clout. The Saudi monarchy can leverage its “custodianship of the Two Holy Mosques” to co-opt clerics and suppress ‘Islamist’ dissent. The UAE, without such tools, sees ideological confrontation as existential.

Hence, its choice to back the STC was both strategic and ideological: a secular secessionist force to counterbalance ‘Islamists’ within the anti-Ansarallah camp. The same logic explains Abu Dhabi’s support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the ‘Islamist’-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces.

Saudi red line

Despite their overlapping interests, Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly diverge in their regional strategies—from Sudan and Somalia to Syria and beyond. Economic competition, particularly in logistics, energy, and tourism, has sharpened these rivalries.

Yet Yemen remains Riyadh’s core security concern. Unlike the UAE, which can retreat to its fortress cities and pivot to Africa, Saudi Arabia faces direct threats from Yemen, including Ansarallah missile and drone attacks on its oil infrastructure.

Thus, Riyadh will not tolerate fragmentation of the ‘Sunni’ front, especially if it weakens the PLC. The December 2025 airstrikes on UAE-backed STC positions were a clear message: the kingdom will not allow Abu Dhabi to unilaterally reshape Yemen’s political future.

Importantly, Saudi Arabia retains international legitimacy as the custodian of Yemen’s “official” government. The PLC, for all its dysfunction, is still recognized globally. The STC enjoys no such status. Emirati investment in its military success counted for little without legal recognition.

Faced with Riyadh’s escalation and diplomatic isolation, Abu Dhabi blinked. The STC’s blitz ended, and its units collapsed under Saudi-Omani coordinated pressure. Abu Dhabi, unwilling to risk broader fallout, cut its losses.

The hierarchy is clear

The Yemen episode settles a lingering question: who leads the Gulf? Despite media speculation of Emirati assertiveness, the kingdom holds the upper hand. It sets the terms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in oil diplomacy, and in US-Gulf strategic dialogue.

In Yemen, Riyadh is both landlord and sheriff. Abu Dhabi may own a few properties on the southern coast, but its tenancy is conditional.

In the end, the STC gambit exposed the limits of UAE power projection. With its proxies in retreat and its political playbook blocked, Abu Dhabi must now recalibrate. Meanwhile, Riyadh has reasserted dominance—not just over Yemen, but over its closest regional partner.