When Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw US occupation forces from Syria in December 2018, his decision provoked widespread criticism, even from within his own Republican Party.
Fast forward to 2025, and the United States remains entrenched in parts of Syria—a presence that reveals a complex web of tactical and strategic considerations.
At a tactical level, the US justifies its continued occupation of Syrian territory through its support for Kurdish militias in the region.
Yet this rationale masks a broader geopolitical strategy: leveraging Kurdish separatism to exert pressure on key players in West Asia (aka the Middle East), including Iran, Iraq, Syria and Türkiye.
This dynamic also serves Israel, which has maintained close ties with Kurdish militants.
The Kurdish issue represents more than a short-term tactical maneuver.
For Washington, it serves as a strategic contingency plan—what some analysts describe as “Plan B”—in the event of the collapse of the zionist project in Palestine.
The creation of a Kurdish state could act as a substitute power center, reshaping the regional balance in favor of US interests.
This context underscores why Türkiye’s efforts to dismantle Kurdish militias in Syria—often carried out through proxies—face stiff resistance from western regimes.
This tension was made obvious by the statement of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan when he stated that “some small European countries participating in military operations in Syria under the US umbrella are attempting to further their own interests by speaking out on certain issues, but this brings no real benefit to themselves or the region.”
Ankara’s ambitions have been further complicated by its miscalculation of the US political landscape and the limits of Trump’s individualistic influence during his presidency.
Türkiye’s assumption that empowering takfiri elements in Damascus would pave the way for US withdrawal and a Turkish-led order in Syria overlooks the entrenched nature of American imperial interests.
Moreover, the ruling AKP’s worldview remains anchored in a west-centric global order—a reality that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has never hidden.
This alignment, however, places Türkiye in a precarious position, as its regional aspirations frequently collide with the entrenched strategies of its western allies.
As instability in Syria is likely to drag on, it is unrealistic to assume that the US will permit Ankara to significantly weaken Kurdish forces in Syria.
The ruling AKP’s reluctance to boldly challenge American interests in West Asia has, in effect, positioned Syria as a geopolitical quagmire for Türkiye.
The quagmire serves not only western regimes but also aligns with the interests of Moscow and Tehran.
Both Russia and Iran view the toppling of Bashar al-Asad as a clear betrayal of the Astana peace process.
Taking into account Russia’s political culture, retaliation against Türkiye’s actions by Moscow cannot be ruled out.
Adding to Ankara’s challenges is Israel’s ongoing occupation of significant parts of Syria, which presents a long-term dilemma.
Türkiye’s inaction in response to Israeli-led operations in Gaza, widely condemned as genocidal, has already tarnished Erdoğan’s reputation across the Muslim world.
Continued softness toward Israel risks further erosion of Türkiye’s credibility among people in Muslim-majority countries.
Meanwhile, instability in Syria and Israeli occupation provide Iran with a potent political and Islamic narrative to justify its support for resistance movements based in Syria targeting the zionist entity.
This development not only strengthens Tehran’s regional influence but also introduces new geopolitical headaches for Ankara.
The repercussions of these dynamics will reverberate far beyond Syria’s borders, complicating Türkiye’s foreign policy and regional standing.
History offers a cautionary parallel.
The US occupation of Iraq initially seemed to serve American interests in West Asia but ultimately turned into a costly geopolitical liability.
Türkiye’s de facto occupation of parts of Syria risks a similar trajectory—with one critical distinction: unlike the US, Türkiye shares a direct and volatile land border with Syria, amplifying the potential for destabilization and blowback.
Without a recalibration of its strategy, Türkiye risks becoming ensnared in a conflict that could undermine both its regional ambitions and its domestic stability.
As Syria remains a nexus of competing global and regional powers, Ankara’s desire to please western regimes and be popular among the Muslim masses, may well serve as a cautionary tale in the annals of modern geopolitics.
Duplicity is an inconsistent and problematic policy strategy especially for mid-level powers.