by Abu Dharr (Opinion, Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 7, Rabi' al-Awwal, 1447)
With faith and reliance upon Allah (SWT) alone, this writer cautions readers—particularly those conditioned by sectarian predispositions—that the following reflections may unsettle or even provoke deeply entrenched and propagandized attitudes.
Forewarned is forearmed.
The Context of Muʿawiyah’s Rise
During the administration of the third khalifah, ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan, Mu‘awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan emerged as the most influential governor in the Islamic polity. His original appointment as governor of Damascus was made by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab.
It is important to note, this decision was not a slight against Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, nor was it meant to promote the Umayyad clan. Rather, ‘Umar’s strategy was to break the Qurayshi grip on Makkah, thereby diluting the influence of what might be described as the “Makkan elite”—those who had long maintained political, military, and psychological dominance prior to Islam’s triumph.
The purpose of this policy was to integrate Makkah’s population into the egalitarian socio-political order of Islam without reigniting armed conflict. The danger was clear: renewed confrontation would have pitted the committed Muslims of al-Madinah against the nominal Muslims of Makkah—those who had embraced Islam outwardly but many continued to retain opportunistic inclinations and an air of superiority.
When Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan, the governor of Jordan, passed away, the jurisdiction of Jordan was merged with Damascus, further strengthening Muʿawiyah’s position. Over time, he became the de facto ruler of much of Bilād al-Shām (Greater Syria).
Strategic Calculus of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman
It is crucial to grasp ‘Umar’s far-sighted strategy. His redistribution of authority was not to elevate the Umayyads but to test whether the Quraysh who had embraced Islam after decades of hostility—many with lingering ties to Byzantine trade networks—could transition into genuine Islamic governance without succumbing to external influence.
For generations, the Umayyads had commercial ties with Syria, a reality referenced in the Qur’an in Surat Quraysh. By relocating them to a frontier region newly liberated from Byzantine control, ‘Umar sought to absorb and redirect their ambitions in the service of Islam.
Upon assuming office, ‘Uthman confirmed Mu‘awiyah as governor of al-Shām, thereby continuing this strategy. Gradually, however, Mu‘awiyah’s power grew beyond what may have been intended. The deaths or resignations of other governors—such as ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Alqamah al-Kinani in Palestine and ‘Umair ibn Sa‘d al-Ansari in Homs—led ‘Uthman to consolidate more territory under Mu‘awiyah’s authority. By this stage, nearly all of Syria was under his command, forming what was effectively “a state within a state.”
Mu‘awiyah’s Exceptional Tenure
Unlike other governors who were periodically replaced, Mu‘awiyah remained in office across the successive khilafahs of ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and Imam ‘Ali. His political dexterity enabled him to perform satisfactorily under ‘Umar’s stern leadership and to flourish further under ‘Uthman’s more lenient style.
His ability to maintain order and satisfy local expectations won him the loyalty of his constituents, who increasingly regarded him as a sovereign in his own right rather than a subordinate to the khalifah in Arabia. Unlike the turbulent provinces of Kufa, al-Basrah, and Egypt—where discontent with governors eventually led to the uprising against ‘Uthman—Syria remained steadfastly aligned with Mu‘awiyah.
The rapport between ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiyah was such that opponents of the khalifah were often exiled to al-Shām, including residents of Madinah itself. When ‘Uthman eventually banished Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, it was to Mu‘awiyah’s jurisdiction.
Abu Dharr’s Exile and the Emerging Power Shift
‘Uthman appears to have regarded Abu Dharr—a fearless critic of corruption and injustice—as a destabilizing force who might undermine efforts to peacefully integrate Makkah with al-Madinah. What he failed to grasp, however, was that Abu Dharr embodied the conscience of Islam, speaking truth to power and highlighting the widening gap between officials and the ordinary Muslim public. Suppressing Abu Dharr did not solve the problem; it exposed it.
This writer doubts that had Abu Bakr or ‘Umar been khalifahs at the time, they would have handled Abu Dharr as ‘Uthman did, nor would they have relied so heavily on Mu‘awiyah. Gradually, a subtle but significant power shift unfolded: ‘Uthman came to be seen as the minor ruler, while Muʿawiyah emerged as the major ruler.
A Critical Turning Point
Thus, Mu‘awiyah —originally a طليق [amnestied by the Prophet (ﷺ) the day Makkah was liberated] and not a صحابي [companion], a designation he later successfully but disingenuously drilled into muslim public opinion as both a companion of the Prophet (ﷺ) and a legitimate ruler. This was achieved through decades of political maneuvering, economic consolidation, and historical revisionism—a legacy that continues to shape Muslim memory to this day.
With the vast material resources of Greater Syria and the remaining Byzantine “modernistic” influence there, coupled with the pre-Islamic generational commercial ties between Makkah and Syria, Mu‘awiyah found himself in a power position to either join together the khilafah strategy which he knew was the social assimilation of Makkah into Islam after it was liberated, or to break away from khilafah central and its strategy and declare himself the ruler of the muslims.
Mu‘awiyah’s control over Greater Syria continued for many years – from the time of ‘Umar in office to the time of ‘Uthman and Imam ‘Ali. There was a type of synergy between Mu‘awiyah and the Levantines. The amity was such that as the years went by Mu‘awiyah was considered by his constituents more like an unbounded ruler than a ruler who took orders from the khalifah in Arabia.
No other والي [governor or regional chief administrator] lasted as long and as incrementally “progressive” as Mu‘awiyah did in his post with the advantage of resources in abundance and plentiful means. Mu‘awiyah must have been pleased to watch one governor after another being relieved of their responsibilities by ‘Umar and ‘Uthman while he carried on unabated and undiminished with more territories added to his jurisdiction.
Had Mu‘awiyah been delinquent in running the affairs of his region, ‘Umar would not have hesitated in sacking him. Had Mu‘wiyah committed any infraction ‘Umar would have reprimanded and punished him, no doubt.
In a cunningly astute manner, Mu‘awiyah kept up a satisfactory administrative performance when the ruler was stern [‘Umar] as well as when the ruler was easygoing [‘Uthman]. This may explain to a certain extent why Mu‘awiyah’s constituents showed no opposition to him or to ‘Uthman in the same manner that the constituents of the other governors in Kufah, al-Basrah and Egypt were restless with their governors and uncertain about ‘Uthman.
Remember those who laid siege to ‘Uthman came from Kufah, al-Basrah, and Egypt – among them you could not find one person from al-Sham. The rapport between ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiyah was such that most of the times when someone disagreed with ‘Uthman, he would refer him to Mu‘awiyah or exile him to al-Sham; even individuals from al-Madinah were sent into exile in al-Sham.
The shift in balance during ‘Uthman’s khilafah laid the groundwork for one of the most consequential transformations in Islamic political history: the transition from a model of khilafah rooted in Madinah’s ethos of justice and collective leadership to a dynastic monarchy centered on familial and clan power.
And so, anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good shall behold it: and anyone who has done an atom’s weight of malevolence shall behold it - Al-Zalzalah, verses 7-8.
