Iran’s Likely Path To Smarter, Decentralized Intelligence Force

Developing Just Leadership

Waseem Shehzad

Muharram 06, 1447 2025-07-01

News & Analysis

by Waseem Shehzad (News & Analysis, Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 5, Muharram, 1447)

To an untrained eye, a boxer throwing the most punches may seem to be dominating. The seasoned observer knows it’s the precision, timing, and impact of the punches that determine who’s truly winning the fight.

The attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the trio—comprising the US, zionists and the EU—began with a series of heavy blows. Their approach resembled that of a brawler entering the boxing ring, swinging wildly like a drunken sailor.

The aggression against Iran, executed primarily by Israel, began with strikes on residential buildings, killing dozens of civilians—including many children. These attacks were swiftly whitewashed by western media, which portrayed them as “precision strikes,” ignoring the civilian death toll and the broader context of the assault.

However, Islamic Iran’s state system was not disoriented or destabilized. It overcame shock of the surprise attack quickly and started to strike the zionist entity in occupied Palestine with ballistic missiles.

Seasoned experts ignored the bombastic pro-zionist headlines in the western media and started asking probing questions. These went beyond the simplistic optics of the trio’s opening salvo.

From the outset, it was clear that the trio relied heavily on their intelligence and terrorist networks in Iran to launch their aggression. This has led many to ask a troubling question: how could Iran’s intelligence apparatus be so deeply compromised?

At its core, intelligence work is driven not by ideology or loyalty, but by money. Recruiting informants, turning insiders, penetrating networks—all of this hinges on financial incentives. To persuade someone to betray their cause, community or country, one must offer something valuable enough to outweigh personal or national allegiance.

Who can afford to pay more? Iran, with its constrained economy under decades of sanctions, or the alliance of imperialist powers—the US, the European Union, and Israel? Their wealth has been accumulated through centuries of exploitation across Africa, Asia, and beyond.

On the money front, the scales are clearly tilted in favor of the trio. The trio’s aggression had the advantage of surprise, especially in their opening salvo.

However, clandestine operations, by their nature, offer only a one-time military advantage unless they are integrated into a broader military strategy that is synchronized with well-defined political objectives. Without such strategic alignment, the initial shock fades away quickly.

More critically, once clandestine networks are activated and begin carrying out attacks, they expose their logistical pathways, communication methods, and operational tactics. The terrain is not in their favor; they are operating in an environment and society which is hostile. Thus, once they are activated, they become the weaker party.

When a clandestine intelligence operation is exposed, it becomes quite difficult and costly for the compromised side to maintain operational momentum. In the long run, it is not possible to reinvent a new playbook.

During the Cold War, Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet GRU officer spied for the CIA and MI6. While his intelligence was crucial during the Cuban Missile Crisis, his exposure in 1962 led to the collapse of the entire support network around him. Soviet counterintelligence gained insight into western espionage tactics, communication methods, and logistical channels.

Considering how Iran’s internal security forces quickly began arresting agents of the trio inside the country, who were using tools such as drones and car bombs, it becomes clear that Iran rapidly cracked the trio’s operating methodology.

By the third day of aggression, it became increasingly clear that the trio lacked a coherent political and military strategy behind their actions. At the same time, Iran’s ballistic missile response was inflicting continuous and severe damage on the zionist entity. Never since their usurpation of Palestine had the zionists faced such sustained and devastating firepower.

As this episode of the ongoing regional war appears to have concluded—for now at least—it is clear that Israel has failed to gain any operational advantage over Iran’s primary strategic weapon.

For decades, it was well understood that Tehran relies on its ballistic missile arsenal as a central tool in its resistance against zionism and US imperialism.

Iranian missiles continued to strike targets in occupied Palestine until the very last moments before the tenuous ceasefire went into effect on June 24, underscoring that they remain firmly in place and continue to pose a serious challenge to apartheid Israel.

Iran emerged from this round of the ongoing regional war with valuable battlefield experience in ballistic warfare, a clearer understanding of its operational shortcomings, and—perhaps most importantly—an increase in both internal political cohesion and regional political capital.

From the very first day of Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Crescent International had accurately designated the conflict as a regional war, one that will unfold in intervals and is unlikely to end any time soon.

As preparations begin for the next round between the trio and Islamic Iran, Tehran is fully aware of the areas it must improve. Its adversaries, on the other hand, appear to have walked away from this confrontation without gaining any meaningful achievements.

Based on our open-source analysis, two of Iran’s most pressing shortcomings are a lack of operational autonomy and insufficient camouflage of its leadership. Both issues, however, are relatively straightforward to address through reforms in organizational culture, streamlined administrative procedures and the elevation of experienced cadre into key leadership roles.

To strengthen operational autonomy, Iran’s intelligence services are likely to decentralize command structures, empowering field units to make tactical decisions within a defined strategic framework. This involves training mid-level operatives in scenario-based decision-making and establishing compartmentalized cells to limit the impact of any potential breach.

To address the insufficient camouflage of intelligence leadership, Iran will probably enhance identity protection. Reducing digital exposure, enforcing strict operational security protocols, and implementing advanced counter-surveillance measures will likely take place to minimize visibility and safeguard leadership from targeting and infiltration.

The key challenge in Iran’s likely reformation of its intelligence services will be how to decentralize its forces while still maintaining a coherent command and control structure. Excessive decentralization can leave an organization disoriented and porous, undermining coordination and security. On the other hand, overly rigid centralization can lead to stagnation, limiting adaptability and responsiveness in dynamic operational environments.

Success will likely depend on developing an intelligence culture that rewards both initiative and discipline.

Whatever tactics Iran’s intelligence services choose to deploy, one thing is clear: the trio will have to start formulating a new playbook.

Considering that western regimes are stuck in a geopolitical quagmire in Ukraine and are being pressured by Russia across all domains, they are operating under serious military, political, and economic constraints. Adding to this is the fact that the leader of the most powerful entity behind western imperialism today is an ignoramus in the White House. Given these conditions, the long game is clearly in Iran’s favor.