Islamic Iran After Imam Khomeini: Adaptation Or Abandonment?

Developing Just Leadership

Waseem Shehzad

Dhu al-Hijjah 05, 1446 2025-06-01

Islamic Movement

by Waseem Shehzad (Islamic Movement, Crescent International Vol. 55, No. 4, Dhu al-Hijjah, 1446)

When the Islamic movement in Iran led by Imam Khomeini overthrew the western-backed despotic monarchy in 1979, the event and the surrounding processes became the focus of global attention across political, economic, military, and intellectual domains.

This remains true to this day, as the developments set in motion by the Islamic Revolution have not receded from the headlines.

As Islamic Iran continues to serve as the epicenter of geopolitical confrontation in West Asia and beyond, a key question on many minds is whether the Islamic state system can uphold the ideological framework established by Imam Khomeini.

This analysis does not seek to gloss over the internal and external challenges, missteps, or shortcomings Islamic Iran has faced over the past 45 years.

Rather, its purpose is to examine—within a realistic and fair framework—whether the Islamic Republic is actually deviating from the vision laid out by Imam Khomeini, or it is adapting to evolving circumstances while remaining anchored to its foundational Islamic principles.

Policy assessments should be grounded in objective historical evidence.

Given that Islamic Iran had every opportunity to follow the path of countries like Jordan, Türkiye, or Egypt in aligning with western imperial interests and zionist agenda—but chose not to—it is implausible, beyond mere speculation, to argue that after 45 years of consistent resistance, the Islamic system will now capitulate to its long-standing strategic adversaries.

Given the regional realities, it is entirely appropriate to assess Iran’s current socio-political and ideological conditions in light of the vision that Imam Khomeini articulated for the Islamic system.

It is also important to recognize that the presence of a Munafeqeen (dual-loyalist) class within the state apparatus is not unusual.

This phenomenon existed during the time of the Prophet (pbuh) as well and has persisted throughout history in various forms across all systems of governance—from the USSR to the United States, and the European Union. It is a recurring challenge faced by all political orders, particularly those with revolutionary or ideological foundations.

Some regional experts focused on Iran often interpret its pragmatism as evidence of a departure from the path set by Imam Khomeini.

While it is true that some Iranian politicians may use the label of “pragmatism” to camouflage deviations from the Imam’s line and vision, this does not mean that pragmatism and principled leadership are inherently at odds. In fact, when rooted in core values, genuine pragmatism can serve as a strategic tool that complements ideological commitment rather than undermines it.

For example, in his widely recognized book Power Manifestations of the Sirah: Examining the Letters and Treaties of the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) (ICIT, 2011), ICIT director Zafar Bangash highlights a key aspect of the Treaty of Hudaybiyah relevant to understanding genuine pragmaticism within the Islamic framework.

Citing an incident recorded in all primary Islamic sources, Bangash recounts how moments before the treaty was signed, Abu Jundal ibn Suhayl ibn Amr (ra), a tortured Muslim captive, escaped Makkah and arrived at Hudaybiyah in chains. His father demanded his return under the yet-to-be-signed treaty. Despite the Muslims’ anguish, the Prophet (pbuh), though deeply moved, urged Abu Jundal (ra) to be patient, assuring him that Allah (swt) would provide relief, and ordered his return as per the agreement (p. 200).

Many Muslims viewed this as a defeat, but Allah (swt) revealed Surah Fath, declaring the treaty a “manifest victory”. Two years later, the Quraysh themselves sought to amend the extradition clause. The Prophet’s (pbuh) decision to “sacrifice” Abu Jundal (ra) served the broader aim of securing the Islamic state by neutralizing the Yahudi–munafiq alliance in Madinah after freeing the Makkan front.

While the possibility of subversion within the Islamic system in Iran cannot be ruled out, internal dynamics and historical precedent strongly suggest that the system is likely to stay its course—though not without facing ongoing challenges.

One of the most compelling indicators of Islamic Iran’s ability to continue to adhere to Imam Khomeini’s vision is its vibrant and dynamic internal political scene.

For those willing to look beyond western propaganda, it becomes clear that the Islamic Republic provides sufficient socio-political space for organic evolution and reform—within the bounds of its Islamic framework. This capacity for adaptation is similar to other political systems, which also evolve within their own ideological parameters.

A clear example is Austria, a relatively neutral case. Because of the country’s traumatic experience with National Socialism (Nazism), political parties espousing Nazi ideology are outright banned from participating in elections.

This restriction remains in place despite a 2013 Der Standard poll showing that 54% of Austrians believed it was “highly unlikely” that Nazi-affiliated parties would win seats even if allowed to run. Nevertheless, Austrian authorities concluded—without holding a referendum—that banning such participation was in the country’s best interest, to prevent any revival of a dangerous ideology.

This illustrates that even liberal regimes impose ideological boundaries when national stability and foundational values are at stake.

Iran’s Islamic framework similarly sets parameters to preserve its foundational vision, while allowing internal debate and reform within those limits.

Considering the above factors, while Islamic Iran will undoubtedly continue to face persistent internal and external efforts to divert it from the path set by Imam Khomeini, the Islamic sector of Iranian society and the state fully recognize that internal subversion would lead to outcomes akin to Libya or present-day Syria—pseudo-states stripped of genuine political agency and sovereignty.

The Islamic segment of the Iranian system possesses substantial soft power, enabling it to mobilize large segments of society organically. When combined with its established hard power, this makes it unlikely that a “Gorbachev-style” phenomenon could emerge to steer the state away from its Islamic foundations.

It is also important to reemphasize, in concrete terms, the resilience of Iran’s internal political system.

The Islamic Republic has seen presidents like Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Khatami and Ayatullah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, each of whom offered distinct visions for the country’s future. While those visions were distinct, they remained within the Islamic framework.

The most realistic political debate within Iran revolves around how to best operate within the framework of the Islamic Revolution—not how to dismantle it.

While there are political factions that advocate for the complete overthrow of the Islamic system, their influence is marginal. Their relevance is comparable to fringe movements in the UK calling for the abolition of the monarchy—they exist, but they hold no meaningful sway over the political direction of the country.

Furthermore, a wide array of Islamic and pseudo-Islamic socio-political currents operate within Iran.

Given the relentless external sabotage Iran has faced since 1979, the system’s ability to accommodate this level of political plurality is a testament to its durability—one that should not be underestimated.

Ultimately, it is not the absence of challenges that determines a system’s longevity, but rather the sustained commitment of a critical mass within society and a substantial portion of the state apparatus to a principled framework. By this standard, Islamic Iran continues to stand firm, actively engaged in shaping its future while resisting efforts to erode its foundational ideals.