Significance Of The Iran-Russia Strategic Partnership Agreement

Developing Just Leadership

Brecht Jonkers

Sha'ban 02, 1446 2025-02-01

News & Analysis

by Brecht Jonkers (News & Analysis, Crescent International Vol. 54, No. 12, Sha'ban, 1446)

The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran signed the Iran-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on January 17, much to the chagrin of the imperialist powers. Symbolically, the ceremony was held mere days prior to the inauguration of Donald Trump as president of the United States of America.

Trump is known for his particularly hostile stance towards Iran during his first term as president, with the key moments being the unilateral termination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that resulted in the reimposition of economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic. The assassination on January 3, 2020 of Lieutenant-General Qasim Soleimani only added fuel to the fire and showed Trump’s unremitting hostility toward the Islamic Republic.

The timing of the new agreement between Moscow and Tehran is, therefore, highly symbolic, especially keeping in mind that Trump was known to being somewhat “sympathetic” towards Russia during his first term.

The Strategic Partnership comprises a total of 47 articles, including cooperation on matters of commerce, technology, counterterrorism, information technology, cybersecurity and nuclear industry. The latter is of particular importance for the Islamic Republic, where the civil nuclear energy program has for decades been plagued by heavy sanctions, terrorist attacks and targeted assassination of scientists.

Russian President Vladimir Putin didn’t mince words on this topic stating that “We continue our large projects, including those in nuclear energy. There are also other emerging projects in the energy sector and good prospects in logistics.”

The Treaty includes crucial security provisions, most notably both Iran and Russia binding themselves officially to not support any nation or organisation that engages in any form of aggression against the other signatory party. The text of the agreement states that the two countries will “strive for deeper and expanded ties in all areas of mutual interest, the strengthening of cooperation in the field of security and defense, [and] close coordination of actions on regional and global levels.”

Of particular interest is the clause on mutual respect for the signatories’ territorial integrity, marking an apparent Iranian diplomatic victory in regards to its ongoing border dispute with the United Arab Emirates. As recently as 2023, the issue of the three islands of Abu Musa, Tonb-e Bozorg and Tonb-e Kuchak in the Persian Gulf caused a diplomatic incident between Moscow and Tehran over Russia’s apparent support for the Emirati claim on the Iranian-controlled territory.

Interestingly, what seems like a Russian de facto reversal of policy regarding the Persian Gulf islands is not reciprocated by a change in Iranian tone regarding the territories that have joined Russia since 2014, notably Crimea and the Donbass regions. Iran has remained largely aloof, at least in terms of official diplomacy, regarding the Ukrainian conflict and the dispute regarding borders that goes along with it.

Perhaps even more crucial is the Treaty’s clear language in opposing any and all unlawful extraterritorial sanctions, including secondary sanctions demanded by the United States and its allies regarding either state. Russia and Iran are currently two of the most sanctioned countries in the world and are consistently being targeted for regime change operations. The text of the Partnership agreement seems to make it clear that, barring the theoretical possibility of a United Nations-mandated regime of sanctions against either Iran or Russia, neither will participate in any form of sanctions against the other.

The Strategic Partnership comes at a crucial time, although negotiations about it go back years. The official signing of the treaty, coming on the heels of the destruction of the Syrian Arab Republic at the hands of Turkish-backed takfiri militias, could serve to quell rumours of a growing rift between Russia and Iran.

Western sources were quick to claim in December that the two main allies of Syria would blame one another for the fall of Syria, which was bolstered by reports of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps complaining on the perceived inefficiency of Russian military support during the last HTS advance.

In a candid response to these claims, an Iranian government representative said rather stoically: “The Russians have their complaints about us, saying we didn’t perform well on the ground, and we, in turn, have complaints about them,” adding that this will not be an obstacle to cordial relations between the two countries.

This has not stopped western mainstream media from engaging in the same two options they usually resort to when it comes to potentially major developments in Eurasia. For the most part, the corporate media chose to simply ignore the Partnership completely, much in the way they have been trying to hush any major reports on the successful expansion of both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS over the past few years. This went as far as to not even mention the huge gathering of political leaders like the SCO summit in Samarkand of 2022 or the BRICS heads’ meeting in Kazan last October.

The second option, chosen by few specialized reporters of major news outlets that couldn’t ignore these significant events, involves diminishing its importance. Western media conglomerates were quick to point out that the Partnership Treaty was not a mutual defense pact, which is true but an irrelevant statement since nobody ever claimed otherwise.

Regardless of the demagoguery and rhetorical trickery that Atlanticist media likes to come up with, the facts are clear. The Strategic Partnership between Iran and Russia is a major step towards the integration of the Eurasian continent, the rise of Asian powers in general and the reconnection of land-based trade routes at the expense of western-dominated naval commerce.

“We have plans for the construction of a railroad [as part of the] North-South corridor. We have plans for domestic production of gas turbines in Russia. We have very good potential areas [of cooperation], including in oil refining. We have an interesting project on electricity supply [among] Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia, so we can ensure mutual flows in the interest of all countries,” Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev told reporters on the sidelines of the Partnership meeting.

One important aspect that the Strategic Partnership Treaty indeed connects, as minister Tsivilev alluded to, is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): a multimodal connectivity project that establishes transport networks by ship, rail, and road for moving freight between India, Russia, Iran and Central Asia.

The concept itself is not new. The idea behind the INSTC was first floated during the Euro-Asian Conference on Transport in the year 2000, and was signed by Russia, Iran and India two years later. However, due to numerous logistical issues and attention being drawn elsewhere at the time, implementation of the plan was delayed.

Renewed interest in Eurasian integration in Russia, increased attention by successive Iranian governments to find partners in an emerging multipolar world, and the Act East policy pursued by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 as an intensification of the older Look East initiative, all contributed to the refocusing of efforts to link these three major Asian countries by the earlier agreed plan.

The accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO in 2017 further boosted possibilities for true connectivity between the Eurasian land powers. Since its inception, the SCO included most of the Central Asian states, therefore making the continental land bridge ever more feasible.

From 2012 onwards, the three initial INSTC project members were joined by interested parties across Central Asia. Currently, the “member” states of what has become an unofficial organisation of sorts, include Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Syria and Turkey.

The appeal of the Corridor project was further intensified by the 2022 Special Military Operation by Russia in Ukraine and the subsequent near total cessation of direct trade between Russia and the European continent, as well as the destruction of the NordStream pipeline carrying Russian natural gas to Europe. Iran joining the SCO as a full member in 2023 was the cherry on top.

At the very least, the INSTC plan could be called ambitious. In short, the Corridor aims to connect the west coast of India and the wider Indian Ocean region, through the Persian Gulf and the Iranian coastline, to an overland route running through Iran and the Caspian Sea states (primarily Azerbaijan) to Russia, and then potentially onwards towards western Europe through Saint-Petersburg.

This primarily overland trade route, which combines rail and road traffic with short-distance sea passage, is a game changer in international commerce, and fits neatly into the revival of the Silk Roads across Eurasia that we have seen rapidly developing over the past decades.

To get an idea of how important a change the INSTC presents to the geopolitical and economic global system, let us compare it to the Suez Canal, one of the busiest and most famous long-distance transport connections in the world.

The INSTC has a total length of 7,200 kilometers in its primary connection from Mumbai to Saint Petersburg. Cargo transport across the multimodal route can complete the journey in about 25 to 30 days; a whopping 40% shorter travel time than the naval route through the Suez Canal. The total cost of transportation is also cut by about 30% when the INSTC route is used.

On July 7, 2022, the first full freight transport from Russia through Iran to India took place successfully. Subsequently, the Islamic Republic of Iran assigned a total of 300 containers for cargo transport to Russia across the Corridor. The Russia-Iran connection continues to this day, with major railway development plans underway.

In December 2024, Iran and Russia again renewed their dedication to the INSTC project, something that is only set to increase with the Strategic Partnership Treaty. And just recently, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Moscow, Kazem Jalali, confirmed that the construction of the key Rasht-Astara railroad through Azerbaijan was already ongoing, and a finalized agreement on it is set to be signed in May.

For Iran, closer ties with Russia present a clear opportunity to circumvent the ongoing sanctions imposed by the US since the termination of the JCPOA during Trump’s first presidency. The Russian Federation, currently the most sanctioned country in the world, is not going to pay any attention to western protests about increased partnership with Tehran. This was already apparent in 2022, when the total volume of trade between the two states reached a net value of $4.9 billion, a 20% increase compared to the previous year. This upward trend continued as bilateral trade value increased by 57% in 2023 and by another 48% the following year.

It is under these circumstances that Iran and Russia signed a major cooperation deal in the field of natural gas in 2022, valued at around $40 billion. As part of the accord, the National Iranian Oil Company and Gazprom would jointly work to develop the Kish and North Pars gas fields, as well as several oil wells and the construction of LNG pipelines across Iran.

Natural gas is a particularly important resource for both Russia and Iran, who are respectively number one and number two in the entire world when it comes to natural gas reserves. In fact, Russia and Iran together possess about 40% of the proven gas reserves worldwide. This has proved particularly frustrating for the European Union, which has consistently failed to provide sufficient energy generation in either fossil fuels, nuclear energy or renewable sources, and remains highly reliant on foreign imports for its domestic needs.

The 2022 agreement was followed up with a memorandum of understanding between the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and Gazprom in 2024, which laid the groundwork for a natural gas pipeline directly connecting Russia and Iran. The planned capacity of 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year corresponds almost exactly with the volume of gas that the destroyed NordStream-1 pipeline used to relay to Germany. Plans are also being made to eventually extend this pipeline into Pakistan.

Despite possessing vast gas reserves, Iran has struggled to fully exploit and develop this capacity (let alone export) due to decades of sanctions and imperialist pressure on every level of society. The construction of a Russian pipeline combined with development of new gas fields with Gazprom support, therefore, fulfills the double role of guaranteeing Iran’s domestic needs for the near future. It also lays the groundwork for profitable export in case of future extension to consumers like Pakistan and India.

The close cooperation with Russia comes on the heels of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Iran and China that was signed in 2021. That too was accompanied by loud protests from western imperialist powers. This project, part of the Belt and Road Initiative, promises a Chinese investment of $400 billion in the Iranian economy, as well as ensuring steady Iranian oil exports to the People’s Republic for the next 25 years.

It is safe to say that Iran has spent the past years diligently preparing alternate trade routes with reliable non-western trade partners, a project that has continued unabated under President Masoud Pezeshkian just as it had been under his two predecessors, Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi and Hasan Rouhani.

Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Aragchi was clear about the importance of the Strategic Partnership Treaty: the goal is to “replace unilateralism with cooperation and respect” and ensure nothing less than “a new world order in which cooperation will replace hegemony and respect will replace imposition.”

In short, the Iran-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is set to ensure a lot. Economic cooperation and integration, combined with ongoing de-dollarization in bilateral trade; military collaboration in which Russian-designed aircraft, artillery and missile defense systems could potentially be exchanged for the highly successful Iranian asymmetric warfare drones and missiles; further development of Iran’s nuclear energy program; a reliable system of mutual non-aggression and assistance that is further strengthened by BRICS and the SCO.

The Partnership Treaty between Tehran and Moscow is but one of many simultaneously occurring developments that underscore the increasingly multipolar world order that is being constructed worldwide. This is something that the American and European hegemons of the failing unipolar world order will, sooner or later, be forced to accept.